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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
\V. J. TREADWAY, VERA GENE 
TREAD,YAY, and J. E. TREAD-
WAY, co - partners doing business 
under the firm name and style of 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
YS. 
HEBER ULENN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF F AC'rS 
Case No. 
7417 
The facts involved in the instant case are, for the 
most part, in direct dispute. Appellant's statement of 
facts and ''summary of facts'' present only his version 
of the transactions and are interwoven with arguments 
of his position. Respondents therefore feel that it would 
be of help to the court to make a brief recital of the 
facts we feel are material to a proper consideration of 
the ·case. 
Respondents are co-partners doing business under 
the firm name and style of Kenworth Sales Company 
engaged in the business of selling trucks and are dis-
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tributors for Kenworth l\lotor Trucks in this area (R. 
77). Appellant, a contractor, contacted the respondents 
for the purpose of purchasing a large truck to use in 
his business and on February 13, 1946 signed a purchase 
order for the same (Exhibit 1). He advised respondents' 
representative, Mr. Golightly, that he desired a truck 
that would haul his ''Cats'' upon a flatbed and also 
permit the attachment of a semi trailer upon which to 
carry his "Shovel" (R. 94). By the term "Cats" appel-
lant referred to Caterpillar tractors and by ''Shovel'' 
to an excavating shovel. He was advised by Golightly 
that it would probably be one year before delivery could 
be made (R. 90). 
Approximately thirty days after the execution of 
Exhibit 1, W. J. Treadway, one of the respondent part-
ners, called upon Appellant to discuss the truck then 
upon order (R. 349). Mr. Treadway advised appellant 
that the truck ordered was not big enough to haul 
"Cats" upon its back, but that one could be constructed 
to perform this task. Appellant advised Treadway that 
he not only wanted a truck big enough to haul a ''Cat'' 
but that he also wanted a truck to be so constructed 
that it could pull a semi trailer upon which to haul his 
"Shovel". Mr. Treadway then advised appellant that 
he would run into trouble trying to build a truck to per-
form these two functions but appellant advised Mr. 
Treadway that he could "handle it." Mr. Treadway 
further advised appellant that a truck so constructed 
would overload the front tires but appellant said that 
he would be able to take care of that (R. 350, 351). 
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Subsequently :.lr. rrreadway received a'' face sheet'' 
and a letter from the engineering deparhnent of Ken-
worth ~lotor Truck Corporation which he exhibited to 
the appellant ( R. 352). rrhis letter questioned the advis-
ability of ront'tructing a truck as desired by appellant 
because of the long wheel base and the possibility that 
too much load would be thrown upon the front axle of 
the truck (R. 353, 357). Appellant told Treadway that 
the engineering department wasn't buying the truck, 
that he was buying it and that was the way he wanted 
it built (R. 359). 
In December, 1946, appellant was advised that his 
truck was ready for delivery in Seattle, whereupon on 
December 27, 1946 appellant issued his check to respon-
dents in the sum of $16,322.10 for payment in full for 
the truck (Exhibit 3). The truck was delivered to ap-
pellant on or about January 2, 1947. 
At no time did appellant, in his discussions with 
1\Ir. Golightly and ~[r. Treadway advise them that he 
intended to use the truck to haul road oils (R. 216, 359, 
~60). 
During the ensuing year after the delivery of the 
truck respondents had occasion to make various repairs 
to the truck, which repairs and services are set forth 
in respondents' bill of particulars (R. 6). In January, 
1948 respondents, at the request of appellant, shortened 
the wheel base of the truck, for which no charge was 
made to appellant. It was not until this time that appel-
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lant made any complaint to respondents regarding the 
trud< (R. ::367). 
Respondents corrnnenced this action by filing their 
cOinplaint wherein they sou_ght recovery for the reason-
able value of the materials and services rendered to 
appellant. Appellant filed his answer to the complaint 
and in an amended counterclaim sought to recover, 
among other things, the sum of $20,000.00 for alleged 
loss of profits resulting from the failure of the truck to 
haul road oil from Woods Cross, Utah to McGill, Nevada, 
claiming that he was forced to hire other carriers to haul 
the road oil. 
ARGUMENT 
rrhe evidence presented at the trial of the instant 
case by appellant and respondents was in direct conflict 
as to all material issues. This being the situation we 
feel that the only major question confronting this court 
upon appeal is whether or not there was introduced at 
the trial sufficient evidence to substantiate the findings 
of the lower court. 
It is fundamental, and a well settled rule in the 
State of Utah, that the trial court may determine the 
facts and judge the credibility of witnesses and that the 
findings of the trial court, if supported by any sub-
stantial evidence, will not be disturbed upon appeal; 
furthermore, this court has held that in such a case, it 
cannot weigh and pass on conflicting evidence, or pass 
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nn the eredibility of witne~~e:::;. In Re Dong Ling Hing's 
Estate. 7~ Utah :12-t 2 Pac. 2d 902, 904. 
nccar<':o c. Booth, rt al., 97 Utah lo:~, ~n Pae. 
2d -l--l-~): 
Jensen r. Logall City, 96 Utah ;)22, 88 Pac. 
2d -l-59. 
\Yith the foregoing rule of law in nlind the respon-
dents will first endeavor to set forth the evidence which 
substantiate~ the trial court's pertinent findings and 
then disc-uss some of appellant's assignments of error. 
POINT L 
THE EVIDENCE "\VAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERS 2 AND 3 TO THE EFFECT 
THAT RESPONDENTS SOLD GOODS, WARES AND MER-
CHANDISE TO APPELLANT FOR THE REASONABLE 
VALUE OF $1,579.08 AND THAT APPELLANT FAILED 
AND REFUSED TO PAY SAID SUM OR ANY PART THERE-
OF. 
Appellant in his brief has not assigned as error the 
trial court's findings, Numbers 2 and 3 and has not dis-
cussed the issues therein in his brief. These findings are 
supported by the testimony of W. J. Treadway, one of 
the respondents, in his testimony (R. 77-79). 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 5 TO THE EFFECT THAT, 
APPELLANT, REGARDLESS OF RESPONDENTS' WARN-
ING, SPECIFIED THE TYPE OF TRUCK THAT HE DE-
SIRED. CLAIMING THAT THE SAME WOULD BE SATIS-
FACTORY FOR HIS PURPOSES. 
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Appellant, at the trial, introduced testimony to the 
effect that the truck delivered to him by respondents 
was improperly designed and would not perform the 
functions for which it was intended. He maintained 
that the wheel base of the truck was too long and that 
as a consequence thereof too much weight was thrown 
upon the front tires. 
In contradiction to this contention respondent, W. J. 
Treadway, testified that approximately one month after 
JHr. Glenn had signed Exhibit Number 1 on February 
13, 1946 he paid a visit to Glenn for the purpose of advis-
ing him that the truck so ordered on Exhibit Number 
1 would not be big enough to satisfy Glenn's needs. 
During this conversation appellant advised Treadway 
of the type of truck he desired and he was warned by 
Treadway that such a truck would cause appellant trou-
ble unless the load was properly balanced upon the truck. 
1 Regardless of this appellant advised Treadway that he 
wanted the truek in accordance with his specifications. 
The respondent, W. J. Treadway, testified as fol-
lows (R. 350) : 
Q. (By Mr. E. H. Callister) Just tell us 
what transpired when you went to l\ir. Glenn's 
house~ 
A. I told Mr. Glenn that order he gave Mr. 
Golightly, to haul his equip1nent, if he was going 
to haul these cats and bulldozers on the back of 
the truck it wasn't big enough. 
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.\nd lh' ~aid, .. \Y<.:~ll, that i~ \\'hat I want. 1 
want a truck big enough to haul a eat and hull-
dozer on the back of the truek. '' 
l said. · '\Y t..'ll, we can build ~rou a truck that 
will haul that, but we will have to change the 
specifiea tions frmn the order you gave l\f r. 
Golightly.'' 
And I asked him what loading space he 
\\~anted back of the cab, and he said he wanted 
twenty feet. 
I said, ''Well, we can build that truck that 
way.'' 
And he said, ·'Xow, I want to pull a low bed 
hack of it, also." 
~\nd I said, "Now, 1Ir. Glenn, you are going 
t() run into trouble trying to build a truck to 
hold a cat and bulldozer on the back of the truck, 
and still build a low bed to pull a semi trailer.'' 
"In order to balance that truck with your 
cat on its back, your frame is going to project 
over the hack axle until you can't hook the semi 
on it." 
He said, ''I can take care of that. I can bal-
ance that cat back there to where I can handle 
it.'' 
And I told him we could build that frarne to 
where it would be detachable, and to where we 
could bolt the back sections together; that when 
we hauled his cat he would use that frame on it, 
and when he put his low bed on he would have 
to unbolt that section, in order for his gooseneck 
of his semi-trailer to hook onto his truck. He 
didn't want that. He wanted it built with the 
wheels put on the extreme rear end of the truck, 
and a twenty foot loading space on the back of 
the cab. 
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So, I questioned him <-1uite a bit about the 
overloading of the front tires that way. 
And he said no, that was all right, he could 
take care of it. \¥hen he pulled that low bed with 
his shovel on it, he wanted that space for the 
boom of his shovel to go up back of the cab on 
the truck, and have a space there for it.'' 
Mr. Treadway further testified (R. 358) that the 
long wheel base was necessary in order to conform to 
the expressed desires of the appellant and that the truck, 
as delivered, could have met the needs and desires of 
appellant provided the latter properly bal·anced the 
load (R. 361, 362,402, 403). 
The foregoing testimony of respondent, W. J. Tread-
way is supported by appellant's own testimony (R. 99, 
100) to the effect that he told Treadway he wanted a 
truck to haul freight, put a flatrack on, put a fifth wheel 
on, and haul a fifty-ton shovel. In other words, appel-
lant, in ordering the truck, gave Treadway the specifica-
tions of the type of truck he desired. 
The testimony set forth above is more than ample 
to substantiate the trial court's findings of fact Number 
5 and it was within the province of the Trial Judge to 
believe Treadway as against conflicting testimony given 
by the appellent. 
The Trial Court, believing the evidence of respon-
dents to the effect that appellant designated the type 
of truck he desired and insisted upon it being built in 
the manner specified regardless of respondents' warning, 
was justified in rendering judgment against appellant 
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upon his counterclaiin. This evidence negatived any 
expre8s warranty or responsibility upon responrlents. 
POil\T Ill. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 6 TO THE EFFECT THAT 
APPELLANT WAS FAMILIAR WITH HEAVY TRUCKS 
AND THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT RE-
SPONDENTS WERE MERE SALES AGENTS FOR THE 
MANUFACTURER OF THE TRUCK. 
It is a well settled principle of law that where an 
agent acts on behalf of a disclosed principal his acts 
and con tracts are considered as the acts and contracts 
of the principal, and, in the absence of an agreement 
otherwise, involves no personal liability on the part of 
the agent to a third person. This rule applies to express 
or implied warranties. 
2 Am. Juri::;., p. 248 ; 
2 C. J., p. 812. 
The appellant, Glenn, had been a contractor for 
approximately 25 years (R. 87) and had used equip1nent 
similar to the truck involved for approximately 8 to 12 
years (R. 222). The original purchase order (Exhibit 
Number 1), which appellant signed on February 13, 
1946, is clearly designated as a contract of purchase 
between appellant and Kenworth Motor Truck Corpora-
tion .. Mr. Golightly signed on behalf of respondents who 
were clearly designated in Exhibit 1 as a sales agent. 
Exhibit 1, in and of itself, clearly establishes the fact 
that respondents were the mere agents of the truck 
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manufacturer and thus not personally liable for any 
breach of implied or express warranty. 
In ·addition to Exhibit 1, the agency relationship is 
further established by the testimony of appellant (R. 
107) to the effect that he knew the truck was being 
manufactured in Seattle and also by Exhibit 6 which 
is a letter directed to Kenworth Motor Truck Corpora-
tion, Seattle, Washington, by appellant's attorney. 
The foregoing clearly supports the trial court's 
finding of fact Number 6, which finding negatives any 
liability upon the part of the respondents for the dam-
ages claimed by appellant. 
POINT IY. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 7 TO THE EFFECT THAT 
RESPONDENTS' ADVISED APPELLANT THAT THE 
TRUCK MANUFACTURER WOULD NOT GUARANTEE 
PERFORMANCE OF THE TRUCK AS ORDERED BY AP-
PELLANT AND THAT APPELLANT, REGARDLESS OF 
THI'S FACT, DESIRED THE TRUCK. 
Upon examination Mr. Treadway testified that sub-
sequent to his conversation with appellant in March, 
1946, he received a letter from the engineering depart-
ment of Kenworth Motor Truck Corporation question-
ing the wheel base of the truck which appellant had 
ordered (R. 352). This letter was exhibited to Mr. 
Glenn. 
The respondent, W. J. Treadway, testified as fol-
lows (R. 357) : 
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..A. They told me that-thi8 letter said the 
wheel base of the truck was long. • • If he is 
going to load his cat and bulldozer on the back 
end of the truck, and he will balance it back 
there, why, he will he all right with it." 
They said, "If he attempts to load weight 
right back of the cab, the truck, with a long wheel 
base, it w·ould throw all the weight on your front 
axle.'' 
And "Jlr. Glenn told n1e he could balance his 
equipment back there, and he wanted it built that 
way, because he wanted to pull his semi-trailer 
"~th it. 
Q. Because he wanted to pull his seini-trail-
er with it' 
A. He wanted to pull a se1ni-trailer with 
his shovel and other equipntent on it, at timet;. 
Appellant refused to heed the warning contained 
in the letter. In this connection Mr. Treadway testified 
as follows ( R. 358, 359) : 
(~. \Yhat, if anything, did :Mr. Glenn say 
during this conversation in which you wei·e dis-
cussing the letter from the Engineering Depart-
ment~ 
A. He said the Engineering Deparhnen t 
wasn't buying the truck; he was buying it, and 
that was the way he wanted it built. 
The trial court saw fit to believe the foregoing testi-
mony of Mr. Treadway which is sufficient evidence to 
support Finding of Fact Number 7, which finding nega-
tives any responsibility by respondents for breach of 
any implied or express warranty. 
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POINTY. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 9 TO THE EFFECT THAT 
IT WAS NOT WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE 
PARTIES THAT THE TRUCK WAS TO BE USED TO HAUL 
ROAD OIL. 
This particular finding deserves particular attention 
inasmuch as appellant, in his brief, has directed all of 
his argument to the second cause of action as set forth 
in his amended counterclaim (R. 32). In this second 
cause of action the appellant sought damages for loss 
of profits allegedly sustained upon a road construction 
job in the St,ate of Nevada. He alleged that by reason 
of the defective truck he was unable to haul road oil 
upon the same which necessitated the hiring of other 
carriers which resulted in a loss of profits to himself in 
the amount of $20,000.00 . 
. It is well settled that in order to recover as damages 
for breach of warranty loss of profits to the buyer, such 
profits must have been within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time the warranty was made. 46 A rn. 
Juris., Paragraph 745. In the instant case the warranty, 
if one was made, was made either by Mr. Golightly on 
February 13, 1946 or by Mr. Treadway one month later. 
Appellant testified that on both occasions he advised 
the parties that he intended to use the truck to haul 
road oil for the Nevada Road Construction Job. It is 
important to point out that the appellant testified (R. 
10) that he had the contract with the State of Nevada 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1') ,) 
to build the road at the tinte of his discm:;sion with Mr. 
Treadway in l\farch, 1946. This was a false statement, 
for as ~hown in Exhibit '· £-\ ·' the bid upon the job was 
not accepted until at least June 4, 1946. 
In contradiction to appellant's testinwny :Mr. 
Golightly (R. 216) and ~Ir. Treadway (R. 359, 360) 
both te~tified that at no tin1e during the entire nego-
tiations with appellant did he advise them that he in-
tended to use the truck for the purpose of hauling road 
oil. The court was entitled to believe the testimony of 
:Jir. Golightly and ~[r. Treadway as against that of the 
appellant. 
HoweYer In addition to the testinwny of .Mr. 
Golightly and Mr. Treadway other facts and circum-
stances are found in the record which discredit appel-
lant's testimony regarding the road oil haul and which 
indicate that appellant's second cause of action, as con-
tained in his amended counterclaim, was but an after-
thought and certainly not within his reasonable con-
templation at the time the truck was ordered. These 
facts and circumstances are related as follows in their 
chronological sequence: 
(a) On February 13, 1946 appellant signed the 
original purchase order (Exhibit 1) for a truck at which 
time, according to l\1r. Golightly, no mention was made 
of using the truck to haul road oil. 
(b) In March, 1946 appellant conversed with Mr. 
Treadway regarding changes in the specifications of 
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the truck and, according to .Mr. Treadway, no rnention 
was made of using the truck to haul oil. 
(c) On Page 1 of Exhibit A which is a copy of the 
contract between Sumsion and Glenn for the Nevada 
State Road Job, it is set forth that bids would be re-
ceived until 2:15 P.M. of June 4, 1946. Obviously, appel-
larnt did not know whether or not he had, the job at the 
time of his conversation with Golightly and Treadway 
and the.refore, it could not have b~en within the con-
templa-tion of the p~arties that appellarnt might suJJe1· 
loss of profits from the operation of am unestablished 
business. 
(d) The truck was not delivered to appellant until 
January 2, 194 7 and he did not commence the hauling 
of oil by other carriers to the Nevada Road Job until 
.June, 1947 (Exhibit 4). 
(e) On November 20, 1947 appellant's attorney 
wrote a letter to Kenworth Motor Truck Corporation 
(Exhibit 6) wherein complaint was made of the truck 
but no mention made of any loss of profits from the 
road oil haul. 
(f) On or about January 5th respondents short-
ened the wheel base of appellant's truck (Exhibit C) 
at which time no mention was made of any loss of profits 
from the road oil haul. 
(g) On August 11, 1948 appellant filed his answer 
and counterclaim to respondents' complaint wherein 
nothing is contained relating to any loss of profits from 
the road oil haul. 
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~h) On Deceu1ber 11, 1948 appellant·~ deposition 
was taken (Exhibit G) wherein he was asked at Page 8 
of that deposition, what he had told Mr. Treadway he 
wanted the truck to do. Appellant answered that he 
wanted the truck to haul a cat upon its back and pull a 
semi-trailer behind it for the purpose of moving a fifty-
flve ton shovel. At no place in the deposition, although 
given the opportunity so to do, did appellant rrtake the 
state1nent that he wanted the truck for the purpose of 
hauling road oil ( R. 538). 
( i) On January 18, 1948 the trial court held a 
pre-trial hearing and entered its pre-trial order on the 
same date. At this time no mention was made nor any 
issue raised regarding loss of profits from the hauling 
of roarl oil (R. 27). 
(j) On January 24, 1949, the first day of the trial, 
the appellant filed his amended counterclaim in which 
he sought damages for the loss of profits from the road 
oil haul. This was the first time that a;n;y mention or 
iwt,·cation was made by the appellant that he had suffer-
Pd any such loss. 
Certainly it is apparent from the foregoing that 
appellant's claim for damages as contained in his second 
cause of action was but an after-thought and was never 
within his contemplation nor within the contemplation 
of the respondents during any part of their negotiations. 
l\fr. Glenn's testimony was to the effect that he 
intended to use the truck to haul road oil from Woods 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
Cross, Utah over the highways of the State of Utah to 
the road construction job near McGill, Nevada. He 
stated that he planned to put a 5000 gallon tank upon 
the truck and another 5000 gallon tank upon his trailer, 
thus enabling him to haul 10,000 gallons of road oil at 
one time (R. 186). He further testified (R. 187) that 
the total weight of his truck, together with the two 5000 
gallon tanks, filled with road oil, and excluding the 
weight of the trailer, would amount to at least 106,000 
pounds. He admitted that this would be in excess of 
the weight permitted by the laws of the State of Utah 
(R. 187). 
Mr. R. A. Gould, an experienced tank truck oper-
ator, testified (R. 305) that the maximum amount of gas-
oline which could be hauled by truck and trailer was 
7000 gallons and that road oil weighed more than did 
gasoline. He also stated (R. 318) that it would be im-
possible to build or design a truck and trailer that would 
carry 10,000 gallons of road oil and operate upon the 
highways of the State of Utah. 
Thus, it is seen that not only was the issue of loss 
of profits from the road oil haul an after-thought but 
that appellant's alleged plan for hauling the oil was 
impossible to carry out. 
It should be noted that appellant's loss of profits, 
if any, from the failure to haul the road oil in the truck 
was extremely speculative and uncertain of ascert·ain-
ment. This is particularly true with respect to the rela-
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tionship between the appellant and 1\lr. J in1 Su1nsion. 
~-\ppellant testified (R. 150) that he and Mr. Sumsion 
bid jointly on the job at :McGill, Nevada. The bills of 
lading contained in Exhibit 4 designated '' Sumsion and 
Glenn'' as the consignees of the road oil used upon the 
Nevada job. ~[r. \Yilliam Weir, through whom the road 
oil wa:S purchased, testified (R. 452) that his dealings 
regarding· the purchase of road oils was with ~ir. J. W. 
Sumsion. Exhibits D and E (R. 460) which were tele-
grarns directed to Wasatch Oil Refining relating to ship-
ment of road oil were sent by l\fr. J. W. Sumsion. No 
written document was introduced to show what was the 
distribution of profit and losses, if any, between Sumsion 
and Glenn. It is contended that respondents' objection 
to the introduction of Exhibit 4 (R. 155) should have 
been sustained by the Trial Court for the reason that 
the parties who purchased the oil and who shipped it 
were Stunsion and Glenn, operating as a joint venture, 
and foreign to the instant action. Appellant is not the 
proper party to maintain a suit for any loss of profits 
resulting from the Nevada road job which was bid upon 
jointly hy himself and Mr. Sumsion. 
There is an annotation in 32 ALR 120 et seq which 
contains a rather exhaustive discussion relating to loss 
of profits as an element of damages. As pointed out in 
this annot,ation, such damages must have been within 
the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered 
into the contract, the damages must be certain and un-
speculaive and they must be the direct result of the 
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breach. At Page 153 of this annotation the following 
statement is made: 
''Probable profits from the operation of an 
unestablished business are too uncertain and con-
jectural for the loss thereof to form the basis for 
the assessment of damage for the breach of con-
tract for the sale of a machine or machinery for 
the buyers use.'' 
It was held in Schaefetr v. Fiedler (Ind.) 63 N.E. 
2d 310, that loss of profits because of inability to carry 
out a contract with another is not generally recoverable 
upon a breach of warranty, since such damage is not 
the usual, natural and probable consequence of the 
breach, and if recoverable at all, such damages must 
be recovered as special damages on the theory that it 
was within the actual contemplation of the 'parties and 
included in the agreement. 
Thus it is seen that there was more than ample 
evidence upon which the Trial Court could base its 
Finding of Fact Number 9 to the effect that appellant 
did not advise respondents that he intended to use the 
said truck for the purpose of transporting road oil and 
that it was not within the contemplation of the parties 
that the truck was to be used for such a purpose. In 
view of this a:prpellant is precluded from recovering any 
damages based upon any loss of profits incurred by 
reason of his failure to haul road oil with the truck. 
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POl~T VI. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 10 TO THE EFFECT THAT 
APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE OR ATTEMPT TO HAVE 
THE WHEEL BASE OF THE TRUCK SHORTENED AND 
THUS FAILED TO EXERCISE THE CARE AND DILI-
GENCE OF AN ORDINARY, REASONABLE PERSON IN 
l\IINil\HZING OR FORECLOSING DAMAGES WHICH HE 
MIGHT SUFFER. 
The appellant was aware of the fact that the truck 
had a long wheel base which would tend to throw too 
much weight upon the front tires. He was aware of 
this following his first conversation with Mr. Treadway 
in _Jfarch, 1946 in which the latter warned appellant 
of this probable difficulty (R. 350-351). He was further 
advised that the long wheel base would throw all the 
weight upon the front axle when Mr. Treadway exhibited 
to him the letter received from the Engineering Depart-
ment of Kenworth Motor Truck Corporation (R. 357). 
l\:fr. Treadway testified (R. 400) that there were 
numerous concerns in Salt Lake City and surrounding 
area that could perform the job of shortening the wheel 
base upon the truck. This testimony was substantiated 
by that of Mr. Harold Slack, shop superintendent for 
Fruehauf Trailer Company, that his concern in Salt 
Lake City was capable of shortening the wheel base of 
a truck similar to Mr. Glenn's (R. 584). 
Respondents, at the request of Mr. Glenn, shortened 
the wheel base in January, 1948 and Mr. Glenn testified 
that the same performed satisfactorily thereafter. In 
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view of the fact that ~lr. Glenn was aware of the cause 
of his difficulty, if any, he could have remedied the situa-
tion by having the wheel base shortened at any one of 
a number of autornotive concerns at a comparatively 
low cost. The cost of shortening the wheel base was 
established as being in the amount of $277.09 (Exhibit 
C). It was incumbent upon appellant to take the steps 
which an ordinary, reasonable and prudent man would 
do under the circumstances and have the wheel base 
shortened, at a cost not to exceed $300.00 and thus 
avoid a $25,000.00 alleged loss in profits. 
In 81 ALR, 282, the general rule relating to dam-
ages is stated as follows: 
''The cardinal principle of the law of dam-
ages is that the injured party shall have com-
pensation for the injuries sustained. But the 
liability of the delinquent is limited to such con-
sequences as are the direct and immediate con-
sequences of his act, and not remote, speculative. 
and contingent consequences. And, on the same 
principle, where by the use of reasonable mea-
sures the plaintiff could have prevented or re-
duced the loss, his recovery will be limited to 
that consideration.'' 
"The rule applies where the buyer of a 
machine, or machinery, for his own use, seeks to 
recover for loss of profit as a consequential lo~:-; 
growing out of the breach of the contract by the 
seller. If all the other elements permitting the 
recovery of such damages are present, the buyer 
cannot recover for such loss if he might reason-
ably have avoided it.'' 
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To the effect that the buyer has a duty to 1ninimize 
damages, see the following: 
,~ ol. ~3, \Villi~ ton 8ale~, He..-ised Edition, Page~ 
378,380; 
Restaten1ent of Contracts, Paragraph 336 (d) ; 
Yo1. 1, Uniforn1 Laws Annotated, Sales, Page 
±23; 
liaberkorn vs. Lawrenee (Ill.) 68 N. E. :2d 
621; 
Bailey vs. Roebuck (Old.) 275 P. 329; 
0. C. Barber :.Mining Con1pany vs. Brown 
Hoisting Machine Company, 258 Fed. 1 ; 
People's State Bank vs. Randby (:!\finn) HJ7 
~- w. 265. 
The evidence introduced was sufficient to support 
the Trial Court's Finding that appellant failed to exer-
cise the care and diligence which an ordinary and pru-
dent person should do in minimizing the damages, if 
any. 
POINT YII. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 13 TO THE EFFECT THAT 
RESPONDENTS AT NO TIME MADE OR GAVE ANY SPE-
CIAL WARRANTY CONCERNING THE TRUCK. 
Throughout the preceding portion of this argument 
respondents have endeavored to point out the evidence 
and testimony which negatived any special warranty 
concerning the truck which appellant purchased. In 
addition to such evidence and testimony we have appel-
lant's Exhibit 1, which by its express terms limits the 
liability of Kenworth Motor Truck Corporation respect-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
ing warranties. On the reverse side of Exhibit 1 there 
is contained the following provision: 
"THIS IS TO CEHTIFY THAT \VE \V..:\ H-
HANT each new commercial motor vehicle manu-
factnred hy us to he free frmn defects in material 
and workmanship under norrnal use and service, 
our obligation under this warranty being limited 
to making good at our factory any part or parts 
thereof which shall be returned to us with trans-
portation charges prepaid, and which our exam-
ination shall disclose to our satisfaction to have 
been thus defective provided that such part or 
parts shall be so returned to us not later than 
ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle 
to the original purchaser, and that at the time of 
such return, the said vehicle shall not have been 
operated in excess of five thousand (5,000) miles. 
This warranty is expressly in lieu of all other 
warranties expressed or implied and of all other 
obligations or liabilities on our part, and -we nei-
ther assume nor authorize any other person to 
assume for us any other liability in connection 
\Vith the sale of our vehicles.'' 
Certainly the provisions of Exhibit 1, together with 
other testimony and evidence, supports the Trial Court's 
finding that respondents at no time made or gave any 
special warranty concerning appellant's truck. 
POINT VIII. 
APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR DO NOT 
CONSTITUTE GROUNDS OR REASONS FOR REVERSAL 
OF TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
In his brief Appellant has set forth ten Assign-
ments of Error upon which he asked this court to reverse 
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the decision of the Trial Court. Respondents do not 
feel that any of the Assigninents contain grounds for 
reversal and that the Trial Court's judgment should he 
sustained. \V e will briefly endeavor to discuss and 
answer some of appellant's Assignments of Error. 
1. The Trial Court did no't refuse appellant the 
right of C'ross-examination. At page 5 of his brief ap-
pellant contends that the Trial Court committed error 
in refusing him the right of cross-examination. He 
refers to R. 82 to substantiate his position. A reading 
of this portion of transcript reveals that appellant was 
not refused the right of cross examination but was 
merely precluded from asking questions which the Trial 
Court properly considered to be improper upon cross 
examination. Appellant was allowed to cross examine 
the witness, Treadway, upon all matters testified to upon 
direct examination and appellant was later allowed to 
examine the witness fully and completely upon all issues. 
2. The Trial Co'ttrt did not commit er'r<O!f' in refus-
~ng to permit evidence of warranty. Appellant, in his 
second Assignment of Error, which is argued on page 
7 of his brief, contends that the Trial Court wrongfully 
refused him the right to introduce evidence relating to 
an advertisement. He refers this court to R. 88-89 of 
the record. It need only he noted that the appellant did 
not offer into evidence the actual advertisement but 
merely tried to prove the same by hearsay. This the 
eourt properly refused. 
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3. The Trial Court did not commit prejudicial 
error in stating that he would1 ignore le.ading questions. 
It is difficult for respondents to follow appellant's argu-
ment concerning his third Assignment of Error which 
is contained on pages 7 and 8 of his brief. Suffice it to 
say that leading questions are improper and subject to 
objection and the court may properly disregard answers 
to such questions. 
4. The Trial Court di·d not commit error in failing 
to impose ·a d!uty upon respondents to furnish equ~pment 
that would sustain its ·own weight and .refusing to im-
pose liability upon respond;ents. Appellant's Assign-
ment of Error Number 4 is discussed in his brief at 
pages 8-17. Many authorities are cited by appellant to 
the effect that a seller may be liable in dama_ges for 
breach of warranty for losses directly and naturally 
resulting in the ordinary course of events. With this 
rule of law respondents have no quarrel. However, as 
has previously been pointed out in this brief, respond-
ents made no special warranty and the loss of profits 
which appellant contends he sustained were not the 
direct and natural result, in the ordinary course of 
events, from the breach of any warranty. (See Points 
IV, V, VI, and VII of this brief.) 
The rules of law set forth by appellant in this argu-
ment have no application to the instant case hecause of 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion which have been set forth previously in this brief 
in detail. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
q-
_,) 
5. Re.spumlenf~ j'unti"'hed appellarnt the t,ype of 
f r1.1ck 'll'h icli he specified. Appellants Assignment of 
Error Nun1ber 5 is closely aligned with his Assignment 
of Error N u1nber 4 and the argun1ent which respondents 
have set forth in the preceding paragraph have equal 
application to this assignment. 
There is testimony to the effect that appellant 
ordered the particular truck, despite warnings from 
respondents and further it was testified that the truck 
as delivered could haul the items, which appellant repre-
sented he wanted to haul, if the same had been properly 
balanced (R. 361, ~62, 368). 
6. The dama9es claimed by appellant were not 
sustained directly and naturally as the result of a bre·ach 
of warranty and were not within the contemplation ·Of 
the parties. Appellant, at Page 18 of his b:rief, contends 
that a judgment for him in the sum of $20,000.00 was 
mandatory. He states that the unrefuted evidence shows 
that appellant sustained a $20,000.00 loss. This con-
tention has been fully covered in the preceding portions 
of this brief wherein evidence and testimony was set 
forth to the effect that the hauling of 10,000 gallons 
of road oil with the truck was not within the contem-
plation of the parties, the damages were speculative, 
and the appellant got just exactly what he ordered. 
7. Sufficient evidence was in,troduced to the effect 
that appellant was warned of probable f~ailure of per-
formwnce becau-se of long wheel base. Appellant's As-
signment of Error Number 7 is to the effect that the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
Trial Court's finding of Fact Nu1nber 7 is contrary to 
the evidence. This contention has been fully covered 
under Point IV of this brief. Mr. Treadway warned 
appellant of the long wheel base during his first con-
versation with the latter in 1iarch, 1946 and subse-
quently advised appellant that the Engineering Depart-
ment of Kenworth Motor Truck Corporatjon had writ-
ten a letter in which they questioned the advisability 
of the long wheel base. 
The testimony set forth by appellant on Pages 18 
and 19 of his brief is not inconsistent for the warnings 
and other testimony of Mr. Treadway. At the trial :Mr. 
Treadway contended throughout that the truck, as de-
livered, could perform the tasks as outlined by appel-
lant had the latter balanced the loads properly (R. 361, 
362, 368). 
8. Finding that appellant .requested the truck de-
livered was not contra,ry to the evidence. Appellant's 
Assignment of Error Number 8 is to the effect that there 
was not sufficient evidence to sustain the Trial Court's 
Finding of Fact Number 5. This contention has been 
fully covered under Point II of this brief. 
9. Finding that appellarnt could have corrected any 
defect in the truck is not contrary to the evidence. Ap-
pellant's Assignment of Error Number 9 takes issue 
with the Trial Court's Findings of Fact Numbers 9 and 
10. This contention is fully answered by the argument 
contained in Point VI of this brief. 
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\Ye respectfully ~ubmit that appellant has failed 
to 8how any error in the trial below. There was suffi-
cient evidence adduced at the trial to substantiate the 
Trial Court·~ findings: 
(a) That appellant ordered the type of truck 
delivered, regardless of warnings from respondents. 
(b) That respondents were mere sales agents for 
the manufacturer of the truck, which fact was known 
to appellant. 
(c) That appellant insisted upon the truck as or-
dered, regardless of a warning from the manufacturer 
of the truck. 
(d) That at no time did appellant advise respond-
ents that he intended to use the truck for the purpose 
of transporting road oil and that the same was not with-
in the contemplation of the parties. 
(e) That appellant did not exercise the care and 
diligence that an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person 
should do in correcting any defect and thus minimizing 
the damages. 
(f) That respondents at no time made or gave 
any special warranty cdncerning said truck. 
It is respondents' contention that sufficient evi-
dence was introduced to substantiate all of the foregoing 
Findings and that any one of said Findings is suffi-
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cient to sustain the judgment of no cause of action a.s 
to appellant's counterclaim. The judgment of the Trial 
Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALLISTER, CALLISTER & LEWIS 
Attorneys for Restpondents 
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